Fact Check: Did Türkiye Take Sides in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, or Did It Broker a Deal Both Russia and Ukraine Signed?

By Frontline Diplomacy Editorial Team

Why It Matters

Türkiye did broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and both Russia and Ukraine agreed to it, but they did so through two separate parallel texts and not through a single document signed by Moscow and Kyiv. Two opposite narratives circulate about this. The first holds that Türkiye was a de facto party to the war that tilted the deal toward Kyiv or NATO. The second holds that Türkiye was only a passive venue with no real diplomatic role. Both are contradicted by the primary record.

Accurate sourcing matters because the Initiative is routinely cited as a model, or a cautionary tale, for wartime humanitarian diplomacy. Misreading who signed what distorts every later debate about whether such arrangements can be revived.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

Claim 1: 'Türkiye was a party to the war and tilted the deal toward Kyiv or NATO'

Where it circulates: social media posts, some commentary in Russian and Western outlets, and framings that describe the deal as an 'Ukraine–Türkiye arrangement' or a 'UN–Russia deal'.

The verified correction: The Initiative was not a bilateral Ukraine–Türkiye deal. The UN published the text of the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports, and it was concluded in two parallel versions: one among Russia, Türkiye and the UN, and one among Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN. The Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, and Ukraine's Infrastructure Minister, Oleksandr Kubrakov, signed in Istanbul in the presence of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and UN Secretary-General António Guterres on 22 July 2022.

Russia's own signature, and its participation in the Joint Coordination Centre, are inconsistent with the idea that the framework was designed against it. It is fair to note that Türkiye also sells defence equipment to Ukraine, and Russian commentators have raised this. The grain texts themselves, however, set out neutral, reciprocal procedures for all parties.

Claim 2: 'Türkiye was only a host with no real role'

Where it circulates: commentary that credits the UN alone, or that describes the Istanbul ceremony as hospitality.

The verified correction: Türkiye is a named signatory to both texts. The UN Secretary-General had led the negotiation track with the UN trade and relief officials, and Ankara supplied the political channel to Moscow and Kyiv, the military-technical format, and the physical infrastructure for the inspections. The UN and Turkish accounts agree on this division of labour (see Türkiye's Role below). The UN could not have done it without a party both belligerents were willing to sit with. Türkiye could not have done it without the UN's humanitarian framework and the Russia-facing UN memorandum.

Who signed what on 22 July 2022?

Document	Parties	Subject
Black Sea Grain Initiative (Russia version)	Russia, Türkiye, UN	Safe passage of grain and foodstuffs from three Ukrainian ports
Black Sea Grain Initiative (Ukraine version)	Ukraine, Türkiye, UN	Mirror-image text with the same procedures
Memorandum of Understanding	UN Secretariat and Russia	UN support for Russian food and fertilizer exports to world markets

The three Ukrainian ports covered were Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi (Yuzhny).

Why two separate texts?

The two-text structure allowed each belligerent to commit to the same procedures without signing an agreement with its adversary. This is a common device in wartime mediation: parties accept parallel obligations toward a third party, in this case the UN and Türkiye. It is also the mechanism that let the deal be called a humanitarian arrangement and not a ceasefire. For a wider explanation of this pattern, see Good Offices in Diplomacy: Meaning, Examples and How It Differs from Mediation.

How the Joint Coordination Centre worked

The Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul was staffed by senior representatives of the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine. It had three core functions:

• Registering and scheduling vessels that would use the maritime humanitarian corridor.
• Organising joint inspections of ships, run by teams drawn from the four parties, to verify that inbound vessels carried no weapons and that outbound vessels carried only agricultural cargo.
• Publishing operational data on voyages, tonnage and destinations.

Inspections took place in Turkish waters near Istanbul, which is why Turkish logistics were essential. Russia later complained about the pace and scope of inspections and about other aspects of the system, while Ukraine and the UN stressed that inspections were agreed jointly and regularly carried out.

Volumes and destinations

The UN reported that about 33 million tonnes of grain and foodstuffs left Ukrainian ports under the Initiative; the JCC pages are the primary source for these figures and should be checked for current numbers. Corn and wheat made up the largest shares. Data published by the JCC listed dozens of destination countries, including both high-income and low-income importers. The UN World Food Programme reported that it purchased Ukrainian wheat shipped through the corridor for humanitarian operations in places such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen.

Did Türkiye close the Straits or restrict commercial traffic?

No. Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention allows Türkiye to restrict the passage of warships of belligerent states. It does not restrict commercial shipping, which keeps freedom of transit under the convention. Ankara announced in February 2022 that it would apply Article 19 to belligerent warships, and grain carriers continued to transit the Straits. For the full legal analysis, read Fact Check: Did Türkiye 'Close the Straits' to Russia Under the Montreux Convention?. Our sister publication The Global Anatomy also covers the topic in The Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War; as a sister outlet under the same publisher, it is context and not independent corroboration.

Why Russia suspended and then exited in July 2023

The Initiative was extended several times, and Russia announced on 17 July 2023 that its participation was ending. Moscow's stated reasons were that the parallel commitments concerning Russian exports had not been met. Russian officials pointed to:

• reconnection of the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank) to the SWIFT messaging system;
• obstacles in payment channels, insurance and port access for Russian cargoes and fertilizers;
• the ammonia pipeline to Ukrainian ports and other items they said were promised.

Ukraine, the UN Secretary-General and Western governments responded differently. The UN said it had worked to facilitate Russian exports under the separate memorandum, noted that food and fertilizer were not themselves under Western sanctions, and regretted the decision. Ukraine and Western governments described the exit as endangering global food supplies. Both sides' positions are in the record, and the dispute turned largely on whether banking and shipping frictions were sanctions obligations (which the UN could not override) or promised deliverables.

Limits and Honest Assessment

Türkiye could convene, facilitate and host, but the deal depended on Russian and Ukrainian consent and on third-party assurances related to sanctions, which Ankara did not control. It ended in July 2023 despite Turkish efforts to keep it alive. After Russia's exit, Ukraine established its own temporary Black Sea corridor from August 2023, which operated without Russian consent and in a more dangerous environment, with port strikes continuing. The Initiative's success was real in volume terms, but it was not permanent.

Where Things Stand

The Initiative is not operating. The JCC is not functioning in its original form. Ukrainian-run corridor shipping continues independently of the 2022 framework. The Turkish Presidency and Foreign Ministry have said they remain open to a renewed arrangement if the parties agree, but no replacement agreement has been concluded.

The Table

Party	Core interest	Stated red line or condition
Russia	Implementation of export-side commitments: banking, insurance, logistics, fertilizers	Said it would return only if commitments were fulfilled
Ukraine	Safe sea corridor, food security and export revenue	Opposed to terms that limit Ukrainian sovereignty over its ports
UN	Food security and price stability	Needed both parallel texts to function
Türkiye	Keeping the corridor open and the channel to both sides	Neutral facilitation; continuing dialogue

Timeline

Date	Event
April–June 2022	UN Secretary-General consults Moscow and Kyiv on a grain and fertilizer package
8 June 2022	Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visits Ankara for talks on the grain corridor
13 July 2022	Trilateral military-technical delegations meet in Istanbul with the UN
22 July 2022	Two texts of the Initiative and the UN–Russia MoU signed in Istanbul
Late July 2022	JCC begins operating in Istanbul
1 August 2022	First outbound vessel, the Razoni, leaves Odesa
November 2022, March 2023, May 2023	Initiative extended; March 2023 extension disputed over length
17 July 2023	Russia announces its participation has ended
August 2023	Ukraine opens its own temporary corridor
4 September 2023	Presidents Erdoğan and Putin meet in Sochi; discussion of a renewed arrangement

For the process in more detail, see Black Sea Grain Initiative Explained: How the Deal Worked and Why It Ended and Istanbul Talks Between Russia and Ukraine: What Was Discussed and What Came Out of Them.

🇹🇷 Diplomatic Role · Mediation & Official Record

Türkiye's Role

This labelled section reflects official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

• Signatory and host. Türkiye signed both texts of the Initiative together with the UN, and the signing took place in Istanbul with President Erdoğan present. The UN's published text of the Initiative and Presidency (Cumhurbaşkanlığı) releases from 22 July 2022 document this.
• Shuttle and leader-level diplomacy. Ankara held parallel contacts with Moscow and Kyiv. This included the Lavrov visit on 8 June 2022 and Erdoğan's calls with Presidents Putin and Zelenskyy, as recorded by the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications. For the method, see What Is Shuttle Diplomacy? Definition, History and Modern Examples.
• Defence Ministry-led technical talks and logistics. The Ministry of National Defence hosted the Istanbul trilateral military delegations and, according to its announcements, coordinated the inspection arrangements and ship movements at Istanbul with the JCC.
• Commitment after the Russian exit. After 17 July 2023, President Erdoğan and the Foreign Ministry stated that Ankara would continue efforts toward a renewed arrangement, and the issue was on the agenda of the Sochi meeting on 4 September 2023.
• Legal basis. Türkiye applied Montreux Article 19 to belligerent warships only, and it acted as a neutral party under the Initiative texts, in line with its stated policy of keeping channels to both Russia and Ukraine open.

For the broader record, see Türkiye as Mediator: Its Role in Peace Talks and Crisis Diplomacy. Our sister publication Interstate Journal has a separate analysis, Black Sea Grain Initiative: How Türkiye Helped Broker the Deal; as a sister publication it should not be treated as an independent source.

What to Watch

• Whether Russia, Ukraine and the UN return to the question of export-side commitments, particularly banking and insurance access.
• Statements from the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence on any renewed JCC-style mechanism.
• Security of Ukrainian ports and shipping lanes in the Black Sea.
• UN Secretary-General statements on food security and fertilizer flows.
• Related humanitarian tracks, such as How Prisoner Exchanges Between Russia and Ukraine Are Negotiated.

Source Comparison

Source	Framing	Emphasis
UN (Secretary-General, JCC pages)	A humanitarian arrangement serving global food security	Tonnage, destinations and the linked Russian MoU
Turkish official sources (Presidency, MFA, Ministry of National Defence, Directorate of Communications)	Türkiye as signatory, host and facilitator	Continued dialogue with both sides and readiness to revive the arrangement
Russian MFA and Kremlin	A package whose Russian export side was not delivered	Banking, insurance, logistics and fertilizer commitments
Ukrainian government	A security and food-supply corridor	Safe navigation, global food security and the effect of Russian withdrawal
Western media (Reuters, AP, BBC)	Generally a diplomatic success followed by a Russian pullout	Food prices, Russian demands and attacks on ports; Türkiye is often described as mediator or broker

The differences are mainly of emphasis and not of the basic documentary record. The signing dates, the two-text structure and the Russian announcement of 17 July 2023 are not contested. Wider context is in Crossroads Review: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a sister publication, and in Mediation Files: How International Mediation Works, Process by Process.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body of UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian officials that coordinated vessel registration and inspections.
• Parallel (mirror) texts: two documents with identical procedures signed by different pairs of parties, so no two belligerents sign with each other.
• Montreux Article 19: limits belligerent warships in the Straits; it does not limit commercial shipping. See the Montreux fact check.
• Good offices and shuttle diplomacy: see Diplomacy 101: Key Diplomatic Tools and Concepts Explained.
• Process background: Black Sea Grain Initiative Explained and Frontline Diplomacy: How Negotiations, Mediation and Ceasefires Work.

Perspective Note

Frontline Diplomacy covers international diplomacy with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

• Horizon Politics: Black Sea Horizon: Will the Montreux Regime Hold After the Russia–Ukraine War? — Will the 1936 Montreux Convention survive the Russia–Ukraine war? An explainer on Article 19, NATO and Russian positions, revision and Black Sea scenarios.