The Ankara Declaration: How Türkiye Mediated Between Somalia and Ethiopia

The Brief

The Ankara Declaration is a short political text, agreed on 11 December 2024, in which Somalia and Ethiopia defused a crisis triggered by Ethiopia's January 2024 memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Türkiye hosted and facilitated the talks, known as the Ankara process. The declaration commits both sides to respect Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity while exploring commercial arrangements that would give landlocked Ethiopia reliable access to the sea. It is a framework, not a final deal. The hard details were sent to technical talks.

Status note: this file reflects public reporting and official statements available at the time of writing. Readers should check the latest statements from the parties and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for newer rounds.

Where Things Stand

The political crisis eased after the declaration, but the substance remains under negotiation. After December 2024, the two governments moved to restore normal diplomatic channels, and technical delegations resumed meetings in Ankara in 2025 to work on the commercial and access arrangements the declaration described. As of the latest public reporting, no comprehensive, published agreement on the sea-access formula has been presented, and the parties have not released a detailed text of any such arrangement.

Three questions stay open: what form Ethiopia's access will take, how it will relate to Somaliland's position, and how Somalia's domestic politics and regional security arrangements will shape the outcome.

Background: Why the Dispute Began

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea's independence in 1993 and relies heavily on the port of Djibouti for trade. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had said publicly for some time that Ethiopia, a country of well over 100 million people, needs sea access.

On 1 January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an MoU in Addis Ababa. The full text was not published. Public accounts from the parties differed, but they centred on Ethiopia gaining commercial and possibly naval access to the coast of Somaliland. Somaliland officials said the arrangement could involve Ethiopia recognising Somaliland; the Ethiopian government said it would give 'in-depth assessment' to Somaliland's quest for recognition, without formally recognising it.

Somalia treats Somaliland as part of its territory and rejected the MoU as a violation of its sovereignty. It recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa, and Somalia's president signed a law declaring the MoU null and void. The African Union, the Arab League, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and others urged de-escalation and respect for Somalia's territorial integrity. Tension spread into security matters, including the future of Ethiopian troops in Somalia as the African Union mission transitioned, and Somalia's closer defence ties with Egypt.

The Table: Who Wants What

The parties' positions here are summarised from their public statements. Somaliland's position in particular has been voiced through its government and has shifted with its leadership: a new president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi 'Irro', was elected in November 2024 and took office in December.

Timeline

• 1 January 2024: Ethiopia and Somaliland sign the MoU in Addis Ababa.
• January 2024: Somalia rejects the MoU, recalls its ambassador and enacts a law annulling it.
• February 2024: Türkiye and Somalia sign a defence and economic cooperation framework, which is relevant context for Ankara's later role.
• July 2024: The first round of indirect talks between Somali and Ethiopian delegations opens in Ankara under Turkish facilitation.
• Later in 2024: Further rounds follow in Ankara. Reporting at the time described slow progress and several delays.
• 11 December 2024: The Ankara Declaration is announced after meetings involving President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
• Early 2025: Technical talks begin in Ankara, with ambassadors and normal diplomatic contacts resuming between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

Exact dates of the intermediate rounds varied across reports; the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the parties' statements are the best sources for them.

The Ankara Declaration in Plain Terms

The declaration is brief and general. In plain terms, it does the following:

1. Reaffirms the basics. Both governments commit to mutual respect for each other's sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity.
2. Moves past the MoU. The leaders agreed to overcome the disagreements that arose from the MoU, without relitigating them. The declaration does not name Somaliland.
3. Defines the goal. Ethiopia should have reliable, secure and sustainable access to and from the sea, and this access should take place under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia.
4. Chooses the method. Access is to be pursued through mutually beneficial commercial arrangements, such as port-related trade and services, rather than through territorial or political concessions.
5. Sets a process. Technical negotiations were to begin by the end of February 2025 and aim to conclude within about four months. The parties also committed to continued dialogue and to Türkiye's continued support.

In diplomatic terms, this is a framework agreement or declaration of principles: it fixes the destination and the rules of the road but leaves the route open. For background on how such tools work, see Good Offices in Diplomacy: Meaning, Examples and How It Differs from Mediation.

Follow-Up Technical Talks

The technical track is where the declaration is tested. It deals with questions such as the type of access, the location and management of port facilities, transit and customs rules, and financial terms. Delegations met in Ankara in 2025, and public statements described them as constructive while giving few specifics. Because the declaration set a roughly four-month target and the parties have not publicly announced a final agreement, observers should treat the timetable as a goal rather than a guarantee.

Technical rounds like these often serve as confidence-building measures: restored ambassadors, resumed contacts and regular meetings can matter as much as the written text.

What to Watch

• Outcome of the technical talks: whether the parties announce a concrete commercial access arrangement and what port or location it covers.
• Somaliland's reaction: statements by its government on any agreement that touches its coast or its status.
• Security arrangements: the role of Ethiopian troops in the African Union-backed mission in Somalia and the interplay with Egyptian and Turkish military engagement.
• Somalia's domestic politics: election arrangements and federal-state relations can shape Mogadishu's room for compromise.
• Ethiopia's regional posture: relations with Eritrea, Djibouti and others, and the evolving debate over sea access.
• Next rounds in Ankara: announcements from the Turkish Foreign Ministry on dates and participants.

For how this fits within broader practice, see Mediation Files: How International Mediation Works, Process by Process.

Source Comparison

Different sources frame the same text differently:

• Turkish official and state-linked media present the declaration as proof that patient, inclusive dialogue works and as a result of Türkiye's ties with both sides.
• Somali government statements emphasise that the text upholds Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and that any access must run through Mogadishu.
• Ethiopian government statements emphasise the commitment to secure sea access and a new phase in relations with Somalia.
• Somaliland statements stress that Somaliland was not a party and say its interests and its agreements are not determined by the declaration.
• International wire services and think tanks generally describe it as a significant de-escalation, while noting the vagueness of the text and the unresolved questions on Somaliland and the mechanics of access.

Readers should compare the original official texts against summaries, since the ambiguity in the declaration has allowed each side to emphasise different parts. For our editorial approach, see About Frontline Diplomacy: Mission, Perspective and Editorial Principles.

Perspective Note

Frontline Diplomacy covers international diplomacy with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This file was prepared by the Frontline Diplomacy Editorial Team.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

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