Istanbul Talks Between Russia and Ukraine: What Was Discussed and What Came Out of Them
Istanbul talks Russia Ukraine explained: what happened in 2022 and 2025, who attended, why Türkiye hosted, and what came out, including prisoner exchanges.
By the Frontline Diplomacy Editorial Team. This Mediation File is kept as an evergreen page and revised as developments occur; the update date at the top of the page shows the latest revision.
The Brief
The Istanbul talks are the direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine hosted in Türkiye: one round on 29 March 2022 and three rounds in May, June and July 2025. They did not end the war or produce a ceasefire, but the 2025 meetings led to the largest prisoner exchanges of the conflict and to agreements on returning the bodies of fallen soldiers. They matter because Istanbul is the only place where the two governments have sat at the same table in a publicly acknowledged, hosted format since 2022.
Where Things Stand
No comprehensive agreement has come out of Istanbul, and the political questions that blocked the 2022 round remain the ones that block progress today. The last Istanbul meeting covered in this file took place on 23 July 2025. Since then, much of the visible diplomacy has moved through other channels and formats, including contacts led or encouraged by the United States, so readers should check current reporting for the latest status.
What has endured is the humanitarian channel. Exchanges of prisoners and the return of remains have continued to be negotiated separately from the political track. For how that works in practice, see How Prisoner Exchanges Between Russia and Ukraine Are Negotiated. Türkiye has repeatedly said it remains ready to host further meetings, including at leaders' level.
The Table
In Istanbul, the parties negotiate directly, with Türkiye as host and facilitator rather than as a party to the terms. The table below summarises each side's publicly stated positions; these are positions as presented by the parties, not a neutral finding.
| Russia | Ukraine | |
|---|---|---|
| Delegation, 2022 | Led by Vladimir Medinsky, a presidential aide | Led by David Arakhamia, head of the parliamentary faction of the governing party |
| Delegation, 2025 | Led again by Medinsky | Led by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov |
| Ceasefire | Has argued that a ceasefire must follow agreement on underlying issues; in 2022 spoke of reducing military activity in some areas | Has called for a full, unconditional ceasefire first, including a 30-day proposal in May 2025 |
| Status and territory | Seeks recognition of territorial changes it claims and neutrality for Ukraine | Rejects recognising occupied territory; defends territorial integrity |
| Security arrangements | Opposes Ukrainian NATO membership and foreign troops; has raised limits on Ukraine's armed forces | Seeks binding security guarantees; in 2022 offered neutrality in exchange for guarantees from other states |
| Humanitarian issues | Willing to agree exchanges and body returns | Prioritises prisoner releases and the return of civilians, including children |
Red lines in plain terms
- Ukraine: no formal recognition of territorial changes by force, and no limits that would leave it unable to defend itself.
- Russia: no NATO membership for Ukraine, and a settlement that reflects what it calls the root causes of the conflict.
These positions are drawn from official statements by each side. Where they collide, as on territory and security, the talks have stalled.
Timeline
- 28 February 2022: First Russia–Ukraine talks begin in Belarus, days after the invasion; several further rounds follow, some by video.
- 10 March 2022: The Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers, Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba, meet in Antalya with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. No ceasefire results.
- 29 March 2022: Delegations meet at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul. Ukraine presents a framework built on neutrality, security guarantees from a group of states, and a long consultation period on Crimea. Russia says it will sharply reduce military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv.
- Early April 2022: Russian forces withdraw from the Kyiv area. Reports from Bucha spark international condemnation, and Ukraine's willingness to continue on the same terms weakens. The 2022 negotiating track fades.
- 22 July 2022: Separate from the political talks, the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine sign the grain arrangements in Istanbul. See Black Sea Grain Initiative Explained: How the Deal Worked and Why It Ended.
- 11 May 2025: President Putin proposes direct talks in Istanbul without preconditions. Ukraine responds by pressing for a ceasefire first.
- 16 May 2025: First 2025 round at Dolmabahçe Palace, hosted by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The sides agree on a large prisoner exchange, carried out in the following days.
- 2 June 2025: Second round at Çırağan Palace. The sides exchange written memoranda setting out their conditions, and agree on further exchanges, including of severely wounded and young prisoners, and on returning bodies.
- 23 July 2025: Third round, short in duration. The sides agree on additional exchanges. Ukraine proposes a leaders-level meeting; no date is set and no ceasefire is agreed.
Türkiye's Role
Türkiye's Role (this section reflects official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources)
Concrete role. Türkiye acted as host, facilitator and, in the humanitarian files, a practical intermediary. It provided venues (Dolmabahçe and Çırağan Palaces), opened the 2022 round with a presidential address, and in 2025 the Foreign Minister chaired the opening of the sessions. Türkiye has also offered to host a leaders' meeting. For the wider pattern of this approach, see Türkiye as Mediator: Its Role in Peace Talks and Crisis Diplomacy and the earlier Antalya Diplomacy Forum, where the March 2022 foreign ministers' meeting took place.
Official position. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency have described Türkiye's approach as supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, not recognising the annexation of Crimea, while keeping channels open to both Moscow and Kyiv and calling for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. Türkiye also applied the Montreux Convention, which governs passage through the Turkish Straits, in 2022. The statements are in the press release archive of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mfa.gov.tr) and in the communications of the Presidency, including the Directorate of Communications. We cite them by source rather than by quotation, so check the originals for exact wording.
Concrete outputs so far. The 2022 grain arrangements signed in Istanbul, which were in force until Russia ended its participation in July 2023; the hosting of the 2022 and 2025 negotiating rounds; and the humanitarian outcomes of 2025, including prisoner exchanges and body returns. Türkiye also took part in a 2022 exchange in which Ukrainian commanders were to stay in Türkiye. Ukraine later returned them home, which Russia criticised. No ceasefire or political settlement has resulted.
Why Türkiye hosted
There are practical reasons rather than a single one. Türkiye is a NATO member that sells defence equipment to Ukraine and also maintains trade and energy ties with Russia, and it did not join Western sanctions on Russia. It is a Black Sea state, and the Montreux Convention gives it a particular role in the straits. Both parties also found Istanbul acceptable as a venue, which is a precondition for any host. This is the logic of good offices: the host provides a space and access rather than imposing terms.
Did the Talks Produce Results?
The answer depends on what is being measured.
- Political settlement: No. Neither round produced a ceasefire, a framework signed by both sides, or a leaders' meeting.
- Humanitarian outcomes: Yes. The 2025 rounds led to large exchanges of prisoners and agreements on returning remains. These are confidence-building steps, but they have not changed the political positions of either side.
- Process value: The meetings showed that a direct channel exists and can be activated quickly. That has value, but it is not a substitute for agreement on the central issues. For how ceasefires are normally structured and why they fail, see How Ceasefire Agreements Work: Key Clauses, Monitoring and Why They Break Down.
What to Watch
- Format: whether new rounds are held in Istanbul or move to another venue or another set of mediators.
- Leaders' meeting: whether a Putin–Zelensky meeting, which Türkiye has offered to host, is ever scheduled.
- Ceasefire sequencing: whether the parties move beyond the dispute over whether a ceasefire should come before or after agreement on political terms.
- Humanitarian track: continued exchanges of prisoners and remains, which are the most reliable indicator that the channel still functions.
- Third-party roles: how the roles of the United States, Türkiye and other intermediaries evolve.
Upcoming dates are listed in our Diplomatic Calendar when announced; we do not list unconfirmed meetings.
Source Comparison
The same events are described very differently depending on the source.
- Russian officials (the Kremlin, the Foreign Ministry, Medinsky) present Istanbul as a chance to address root causes of the conflict and say that the 2022 process was undermined by Ukraine's change of course under outside pressure. In 2025 they stress that memoranda were exchanged and that Russia was ready to continue contacts.
- Ukrainian officials (the President's Office, Umerov) say that Russia's terms amount to demands for capitulation, point to Bucha as a turning point in 2022, and describe the 2025 talks as showing that Moscow was not ready for a ceasefire, while valuing the humanitarian results.
- Turkish officials (the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) frame Istanbul as evidence that dialogue is possible, emphasise Türkiye's readiness to host at any level, and call for a ceasefire and a lasting settlement.
- Western and international media (for example Reuters, the Associated Press and the BBC) generally describe the 2025 talks as producing humanitarian but not political results. Some outlets have reported on draft documents from 2022, but the drafts were not signed and their interpretation remains disputed.
When reading any account, check who is quoted, which side's document is cited, and whether the text was actually agreed or only proposed.
Perspective Note
Frontline Diplomacy covers international diplomacy with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Role' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. For our approach, see About Frontline Diplomacy.
Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives
For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:
- Borders & Blocs: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, Black Sea Grain Initiative, prisoner swaps, why it ended and its limits.
- Crossroads Review: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation Russia Ukraine Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, the UN-brokered grain deal and why it ended.
- Diplomacy Arena: Montreux Convention, the Black Sea and Türkiye's Russia–Ukraine Mediation — Montreux Convention Black Sea Russia Ukraine explained: how Article 19 works, Türkiye's 2022 implementation, Istanbul talks, grain deal and prisoner swaps.
Frequently asked questions
What happened at the Istanbul talks between Russia and Ukraine?
There were two phases. In March 2022, delegations met at Dolmabahçe Palace and Ukraine presented a framework based on neutrality and security guarantees, but the process stalled in April. In May, June and July 2025, three direct rounds took place and led to prisoner exchanges and arrangements for returning remains, without a ceasefire.
Why did Türkiye host the Russia–Ukraine talks?
Türkiye has working relations with both governments, is a Black Sea state with a special role under the Montreux Convention, and both parties accepted Istanbul as a venue. It had already hosted the Lavrov–Kuleba meeting in Antalya in March 2022.
Did the Istanbul talks produce any results?
They produced humanitarian results but no political settlement. The 2025 rounds led to large prisoner exchanges and agreements on returning bodies, while a ceasefire and a peace framework were not agreed.
Who negotiated for Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul?
Russia was represented by Vladimir Medinsky in both 2022 and 2025. Ukraine was represented by David Arakhamia in 2022 and by Defence Minister Rustem Umerov in 2025.
Is the Istanbul grain deal part of the same talks?
No. The July 2022 grain arrangements were a separate agreement signed in Istanbul by the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine. They were not a political negotiation, but they showed that Istanbul could host practical deals.
Are the Istanbul talks still going on?
The last Istanbul round covered here took place on 23 July 2025. Türkiye has said it remains ready to host further meetings, but the format and venue of any future talks depend on the parties, so check current reporting.
Related guides
- Mediation Files: How International Mediation Works, Process by ProcessHow international mediation works: who mediates, the four stages from pre-negotiation to implementation, and why peace processes succeed, stall or fail.
- Türkiye as Mediator: Its Role in Peace Talks and Crisis DiplomacyTurkey's mediation role explained: host, guarantor and facilitator in Ukraine, Gaza, Syria, Caucasus, Africa and Cyprus, with official positions and limits.
- Diplomacy 101: Key Diplomatic Tools and Concepts ExplainedDiplomatic terms and concepts explained in plain language: shuttle diplomacy, Track II, good offices, ceasefires, guarantor states and more, with examples.
- Antalya Diplomacy Forum: What It Is, Who Attends and Why It MattersAntalya Diplomacy Forum explained: who organizes it, who attends, how it works, notable sideline meetings and how it compares with Munich, Doha and Raisina.
- Black Sea Grain Initiative Explained: How the Deal Worked and Why It EndedThe Black Sea Grain Initiative explained: the July 2022 Istanbul agreements, how inspections worked, volumes, the Russia-UN memorandum and why it ended.
- Confidence-Building Measures in Diplomacy: Types and Real-World ExamplesConfidence-building measures examples explained: how military, humanitarian, political and economic CBMs work, why they come first, and when they fail.
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